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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JUAN S. CASTRO,

I

A;>pellanl, )

vs.

I

DEPART.lVIENT OF E.;\IPLOYMENT SECURITY AND IlOA~~D
OF REVIE'V OF TI!R INDCSTRIAL C01H1UISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents.

\Case No.

/
I

11355

)
;

I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATE_MENT OF CASE
Petition for review challenging the Department
of Employment Security as affirmed by the Appeals
Referee and the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah holding appellant, Juan S. Castro,
lo be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits under Section 35-4-5 ( d) UCA, 1953,
1

by reason of the fact that he was unemployed due to .1
stoppage of work which existed because of a strike i~
which he was involved.

llELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the Board
of Review and an order granting Appellant unemploymen compensation benefits.

S'l'ATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The Appellant was employed by the Kennecott
Copper Corporation in 1946 (TR-0019) and was still
employed there on July 14, 1967 at the time of a stoppage
of work which was caused by strike of Appellant's
union, which strike was supported by picket lines (TR0020). The Appellant, a member of striking union No.
485, United Steelworkel'ls of America (TR-0020)
served on the picket line on several occasions during the
strike and returned to work at Kennecott at the end
of the strike ( TR-0024) . At all times during the strike
he maintained his seniority, his union membership and
other company connected benefits ( TR-0022). ·while
working for Kennecott, the Appellant, for approximately ten years, had seasonal part-time employment
with the Salt Lake Turkey Processing Company (TR0022) and in 1967 he worked for that company from
J ulv to December ( TR-0022) , ( TR-0024) . Appellant
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riled a claim for unemployment compensation benefits
effective December 17, 1967 ( TR-0045) when he was
lairl off by the processing company due to "Reduction
of Force" ( TR-0045) . He was denied unemployment
compensation benefits on the grounds that his unemployment at the time he filed was due to a stoppage of
work which existed because of a strike against the employer by whom he was employed at the time he filed
his cIaim ( TR-0042) .

S'l'ATEl\fENT OF POINTS
THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF
THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
1.

APPELLANT \iV AS AN E111PLOYEE
OF KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION
DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE
STRIKE.
2.

3. HE WAS UNEMPLOYED DUE TO THE

STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED
BECAUSE OF THE STRIKE IN WHICH HE
WAS INVOLVED.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT VVITH
3

THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE EMPLOYl\JENT SECURITY ACT.

The Utah Employment Security Act was adopted
in recognition that:
"35-4-2 . . . . Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of this state.
Unemployment is therefore a subject of general
interest and concern which requires appropriate
action by the Legislature to prevent its spread
and to lighten its burden which now so often
falls with crushing force upon the unemployed
worker and his family. The achievement of social
security requires protection against this greatest
hazard of our economic life. This objective can
be furthered by operating free public employment offices in affiliation with a nationwide system of employment services, by devising app~o
pria te methods for reducing the volume of unemployment and by the systematic accumulation
of funds during periods of employment from
which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power
and limiting the serious social consequences of
unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public
good, and the general welfare of the citizens of
this state require the enactment of this measure,
under the police power of the state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public emplorment offices and for the compulsory setting asirlt
of unemployment reserves to be used for the bemfit of unemployed persons."
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The Legislature recognized that certain unemploy111c11ts arise by reason of voluntary acts of individuals
aud that, therefore, disqualifications should be assessed.
Section 35-4-5 was enacted to establish conditions of
meligibility in cases of voluntarily leaving work, discharge for misconduct, failure to apply for or accept
suitable work, and for individuals who became unem~loyed <lue to stoppages of work which existed because
of strikes. Section 35-4-5 ( d) provides:

"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
" ( d) For any week in which it is found by the
commission that his unemployment is due to a
stoppage of work which exists because of a strike
involving his grade, class, or group of workers
at the factory or establishment at which he is or
was last employed." (Emphasis added.)

This Court in the case of Gus P. Lexes, et al vs.
The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, De' partment of Employment Security, and American
Smelting and Refining Company, 121 Ut. 551, 243 P.
2d 964, said:
"The 'Utah Unemployment Reserve Law' as it
was first known was enacted in 1953, Chapter 38,
Laws of Utah 193.5. Section 1 declared that the
policy of the act was to lessen the burden of in-
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voluntary employment 'which now so often fa]],
with cru~hing force upon the unemployed worker
and his family.' The act was designed to establish
'financial reserves for the benefit of persons 1; 11 _
employed through no fault of their own.' At that
time this nation was in the throes of a great economic depression. The purpose of providing unemployment benefits was twofold: first, to alleviate the need of the worker and his family who
found no market for their services and w~re de.
prived of wages by the general business collapse;
second, it was a 'pump-priming' measure to provide increased buying power and thereby stimulate our economic system. In present times of
prosperity, neither of these objectives would be :
served by granting benefits to the present claimants. Future times may present occasions when
the cushioning effect of unemployment compensation may arrest the course of a narrowing downward economic spiral so as to make pump-priming
in its raw form unnecessary. Labor's right to seek
higher wages by concerted lawful economic pressure is recognized but the labor force which
chooses to strike in order to enforce its demands
cannot be classified as involuntarily unemployed.
It is specifically disqualified from receiving compensation by statute. Those who are in sympathy
with the striking body and stay away from their .
available jobs in order to uphold the reciproc~I '
pact amongst laboring forces to honor each others
picket lines cannot logically be placed in any
other category. 'Ve believe that consideration of
the background and general purpose of unem·
ployment legislation is wh~t has prompted the
courts to hold that the decision of an employee
not to cross a picket line which surrounds his
place of work cannot be deemed an involuntary
act."

!
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lt appears dear that it is the policy of the Act to
deuy benerits to an individual who remains attached to
an employer where there is a stoppage of work due to a
strike iu which the individual is directly involved.

POINT II
APPELLANT 'VAS AN EMPLOYEE OF
~d~NNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE
STRIKE.
Section 35-4-5 ( d) , supra, denies benefits to the
individual with respect to any week during which he is
still employed by a struck employer where he is involved
in the strike.
The first question that arises is whether or not one
who is on strike is no longer to be considered an employee
of the struck employer. The authorities appear to be
quite unanimous that the relation of employee and employer is not terminated by reason of the strike.
In Benny Cruz vs. Department of Employment
Security, 453 P. 2d 894, April 29, 1969 (involving a
benefit claimant under a practically identical fact situation as is applicable to this Appellant), this court said:
"On April 20, 1967, less than three months
before the strike, he went with the sand company
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on an eight-hour basis, in addition to his work
with Kennecott. He continued on with the sand
company after the strike until December 20
196'7, when he was laid off because of inclement
weather. I-Ie did not quit his jC1b with Kennecott
and he returned to work there after about thre~
months' unemployment after leaving the sa1td
company. From the inception of the strike until
final settlement (eight months) he retained his
seniority rights and other benefits incident to his
employment with Kennecott, he himself paying
premiums on his group insurance policy, etc. H('
had no such rights or obligations, and no such
fringe benefits with the sand company. He co11ceded he would return to Kennecott when and if
the strike were settled, which he did. Under the
facts of this case there seems to be no question
as to an uninterrupted employee-employer relationship during the ,,strike, although there was a
work stoppage . . .
ln Jeffery-De 'Vitt Insulator Co. vs. National La·
bor Relations Bd., 91 F. 2d 134 ( 4 Cir., 1937), 112
A.L.R. 948, the court stated:
"It has long been recognized by the law, as
well as in common understanding, that the rela·
tionship existing between employer and employee
is not necessarily terminated by a strike. As was
well said by Judge Baker, speaking for the Circuit Court ·of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, in
Michaelson vs. United States, 291 F. 940, 942:
'In the case of a controversy over wages and conditions of work in a private and local industry \IC
agree with counsel for plaintiffs in error tha~ a
"strike" docs not of itself terminate the relat1011
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of employer a11d employee. A controversy arises,
and the employees, then at work, say to their employer: "V\I e silall stop work until you are in what
we may consider a more reasonable state of min<l.
\Ve shall deprfre you of our labor as a legitimate
means of exerting economic pressure to induce
you to yield. If we go out, we shall remain at
hand, ready to negotiate with you concerning
fair wages and working rules, and ready to return to work the moment we can agree." If, by
reason of a failure to agree, the employees stop
their work, a "strike" is on. They are no longer
working and receiving wages; but, in the absence
of any action other than above indicated looking
to a termination of the relationship, they are entitled to rank as "employees," with the adjective
"striking'' defining their immediate status.'

* * *

"In Slate vs. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 P.
520, 524, in sustaining a conviction under the
Kansas l ndustrial Court Act, the Supreme Court
of that state said: 'It may be noted that a strike
is not a quitting of employment. The man who
goes out on a strike does not profess to quit his
employment. He still lays claim to his position
and asserts a right to go back and take it at more
a dvantageous terms.'"
See also Iron :Moulder's Union vs. Allis-Chalmers Co.
(C.C.A. 7th) 166 F. 45, 52, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 315;
Tri-City Central Trades Council vs. American Steel
Foundries (C.C.A. 7th) 238 F. 728, 733; Dail-Overland Co. vs. 'Villys-Overland, Inc. (D.C.) 263 F. 171,
188.
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In Burger vs. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Rev., 168 Pa. Super 89, 77 A. 2d 737, the Court said:
"'Vhere there is a labor dispute, whether it
takes the form of a strike or a lock-out, the relation of employer and employee is not severed, but
continues until the dispute is settled or until the
employee secures other employment."

POINT III
HE WAS UNEMPLOYED DUE TO THE
STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED
BECAUSE OF THE STRIKE IN WHICH HE
WAS INVOLVED.
Since the strike does not terminate the relation of
employer-employee, we go to the next question, does the
continuance or the taking of other employment after
the beginning of the stoppage of work which exists because of the strike dissolve the employer-employee relationship?
This Court, in Benny Cruz vs. Department of Employment Security, supra, passed on the specific question of the effect of supplemental or intervening em·
ployment on the matter of the claimant's eligibility for
unemployment compensation benefits.
"The question arises as to whether an employee
out on strike against his employer and who takes
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a job after the strike with another employer, is
qualified for benefits if the latter employer lets
him go for some reason with which the employee
had nothing to do. Generally, paraphrasing the
statement in Calvin B. Scott v. U. C C. in showing qualification for benefits the applicant must
1) show he is not disqualified, 2) that the fact
of employment after the strike alone does not
sustain such burden, 3) the new employment
must be intended to be permanent, with an intention not to return to his former employment, 4)
must be in good faith and of a type the employee
performed theretofore, 5) ~ccomplished and
undertaken by complete severance from his former employment.
"Applying the guidelines above, we can come
to no other conclusion except had Cruz gone
with the sand company after the strike, such employment would not have made him eligible after
being let out by the sand company, under the
facts of this case, the guidelines mentioned and
the authorities cited. The circumstance of double
employment at the time of the strike under the
facts and concessions here, should not .serve to
transmute disqualification into qualification. It
takes little imagination to conclude that were
we to decide otherwise, dozens or more employees, anticipating a strike, by the simple device of obtaining a second job a week or so before
the strike, with a subsequent reduction in force
by the second employer, could become eligible
for benefits. We do not believe such a conclusion
would be compatible with the letter and spirit
of the s'tatute."
In Hopkins vs. California Employment Com., 24
11

Cal. 2d 7 44, 151 P. 2d 299, 154 A.L.R. 1081 Aunot.
decided in 1944, the court stated:
"Section 56 (a) of the California U uemplorment Insurance Act, under which claimants wei·e
originally disqualified, provides that 'an individual is uot eligible for benefits for uuem_plovment, and no such benefit shall be payable to
him * %- * (a) If he left his work because of <1
trade dispute and for the period during which ht
continues out of work by reason of the fact that
the trade dispute is still in active progress in the
establishment in which he was employed. Stats.
1939, ch 7, Sec. 4, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939
Supp. Act 8780d, Sec. 56 (a). A claimant is thus
ineligible for benefits if the trade dispute is the
direct cause of his continuing out of work. If a
claimant who leaves his work becausee of a trade
dispute subsequently obtains a permanent fulltime job, however, he is no longer out of work
and the continuity of his unemployment is broken. If he loses his new job for reasons unrelated
to the dispute, he is unemployed by reason, uot
of the trade dispute, but of the loss of the new
employment. . . .
"The termination of a claimant's disqualification by subsequent employment thus depends o~
whether it breaks the continuity of the claimants
unemployment and the causal connection betwce11
his unemployment and the trade dispute. Su.ch
employment must be bona fide and not a dey1ce
to circumvent the statute. lCiting cases.]
"It must sever completely the relation between
the striking employee and his former employer.
The strike itself simply suspends the employe.remployee relationship but does not terminate it.
[Citing cases.] 1"1ere temporary or casual work
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does not sever this relationship for it does not
effectively replace the former employment. The
worker expects its terminatoin and does not look
forward to that continuity of work and income
that characterizes permanent employment. lCiting cases.J Similarly, part-time employment of
a claimant does not break the casual relation between the trade dispute and his unemployment.
[Citing cases.J Only permanent full-time employment can terminate the disqualification. If
bona fide, it completely replaces the claimant's
former employment, terminating whatever relation existed between the claimant and his
former employer. It must be judged prospectively rather than retrospectively, with regard to the
character of the employment, how it was obtained,
and whether it was in the regular course of the
employer's business and the customary occupation of the claimant. [Citing cases.] In the absence of special circumstances, employment of a
short duration admits of an inference that it was
not entered into in good faith with the intent
that it be permanent.

* "In
* the
* remaining

cases the commission could
not reasonably conclude that the claimants had
obtained permanent full-time employment and
had completely severed their relations with their
former employers. The undisputed evidence
shows that the work secured by the claimants
during the hotel strike was stop-gap employment
and that the claimants had not forfeited their employment in the struck establishments."
In 1960 the matter was before the Pennsylvania
court in Oluschak vs. Unemployment Compensation Bd.
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of Review, 192 Pa. Super. 255, 159 A. 2d 750, awl
quote from their opinion:

iie

" ... The record ill<lieates that the claimant
while 011 ~trike at \V estinghouse, sought and ob'.
tained employment at 11. \\T. Butterworth &
Sons, Philmont Road, llethayers, Pa. The employment began on October 20, 1955, and ended
by lay-off on .March 9, 1956. He di<l not at a111
time seYer his employment or resign from the joL
at \Vestinghouse nor did he give to his employer
or anyone else any indication of an inteution ~u
to do. He testified that the new job paid $1.7.J
per hour plus bonus, on piece work, arnl his job
at \\T estinghouse paid, prior to the strike, $2.1011 ~
cents per hour; that it was similar work; that 'l
said I y,·ould stay if the job was dependable because with the bonus, it would be the same as l
was getting and I said if I made out, I would
stay there'; and that he joined the union but continued his membership in the 'V estinghouse
union. Ile remained on the \V estinghouse payroll as one of the striking employees, with all the
benefits of fifteen years seniority, insurance and
other ineidents of that employment. After said
strike, he was recalled, and with other employees
of vVestinghouse received the additional benefits
won by the strike.

* * *

"The burden was upon the claimant to pr~Ye
he was entitled to unemployment compensat~on
benefits. Smith Unemployment Compensatwn
Case, 1950, 167 Pa. Super, 242, 74 A. 2d 523. An
unemployed person because of a labor tlispt~te,
can only recoyer unemployment compensatwu
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when he can prove that he is not directly interesled, and that he is not a member of the strikin()'
uuion and that he is not in the same grade or clas~
of workers as the strikers. Curcio Unemployment
Compensation Case, supra; Stahlman Unemployment Compensation Case, 1958, 187 Pa. Super,
:.!46, 144 A. 2d 670. In this case the claimant must
establish, that although at the time of the strike
he was disqualified under Section 402 ( d), he
now comes within subsections ( 1), ( 2) and ( 3),
by showing he obtained a new job and severed his
employment with VV estinghouse. The evidence
of an intervening job, standing alone, is not sufficient. Such a job could be stop-gap, part-time
or temporary employment accepted during the
strike for economic reasons. The claimant could
continue to be 'participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work' and could still be 'a member of an
organization which is participating in, or directly
interested in, the labor dispute which caused the
stoppage of work' and could be in the same grade
or class of workers as the strikers. His recall at
the end of the strike by Westinghouse is evidence
of his continued membership in the union and of
the maintenance of his employee status on the
'¥es ting house payroll, from which it can be inf erred that he continued to be 'directly interested'
in the outcome of the labor dispute."
'fhe Idaho Supreme Court held in Ankrum vs. Employment Security Agency (Idaho 1961), 361 P. 2d
795, that the burden is upon a claimant to establish his
rligibility for benefits whenever his claim therefor is
questioned.
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When Appellant was laid off by the Salt Lake
Turkey Processing Company due to a reduction o!
force, he continued to be unemployed by reason of the
strike in which he was involved and through which he
hoped to receive future higher pay an<l other benefit~. ,
He stood ready to work for Kennecott when the strike
ended. He recognized that he was an employee of
Kennecott at all times and that as such he retained hi.1
seniority and other rights ( TR-0022), ( TR-0026). ln
the cases discussed herein, the courts were looking tu
see what effects intervening, supplemental or stop-gap
employment had on the intentions of the appellants with
reference to their claims for unemployment compensation benefits. In other words, did they intend to substitute the new or supplemental employment for th1::
struck employment on a permanent basis.
In Calvin It Scott vs. UCC, and Anaconda Co.,
141 :Mont. 230, 376 P. 2d 733, decided under identical
statutory provisions, the court examined the leading
cases in the several states including a number of those
cited by Respondent and concluded:
"l. The burden i:i upon claimant to show he is

not disqualified.

"2. The bking of other employment by a clain~
ant while on strike, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish that burden.

"3. The new employment must not be of the
stop-gap, part-time or temporary type, but rather
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of the permanent full-time type without intention of returning to the struck employer at the
termination of the strike.
"4. The new employment must have been undertaken in good faith and be of the type formerly engaged in by the employee or for which he
would be skilled and competent.

"5. There must exist a complete and bona fide

~everance of his employment with the struck employer."
In the Scott case, supra, all of the claimants were
members of the union that called the strike with the employer and caused their unemployment; each found some
form of new employment during the course of the strike
ancl then, upon losing or quitting same before the end
of the strike, filed for benefits. All responded to notices
of recall at the conclusion of the dispute. The decision of
the court was that:

"A strike does not sever the employer-employee
relationship. The burden of showing that this
relationship is severed by new employment is
upon the claimant. At best, claimants evidenced
reluctance to quit or renounce their seniority
rights with the struck employer and most admitted that they viewed their new work as stop-gap
employment and that they did return at the end
of the strike. Therefore, under the substantialevidence rule, the lower courts were without
authority to reverse the benefit denials imposed
by the Commission."
In the instant case, the Appellant testified that he
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considered himself to be an employee of Kenneculi
Copper Corporation all during the period of the strik,,
and that he retained his several rights as an employer
of Kennecott. It is clear from the record that his eniployment with Salt Lake Turkey Processing Compmn
·was secured in order to supplement and not be a suLstitute for his employment with Kennecott. There is
only one reason why the Appellant was unemployed and
continued to be unemployed after he was laid off by tlit
Salt Lake Turkey Processing Company and that reason was that the Appellant, his union and other uniurn,
were involved in a strike at Kennecott Copper Corporation which brought about a stoppage of work. In the
Scott case, supra, the court said:
"Having reviewed the records before us of the
various claimants, it appears that in no case did
the claimant sustain his burden of proving he
was not disqualified, and in no case did a claimant ,
show a complete and bona fide severance of his
employment with the struck employer.
"Further, no claimant proved that he harl no
intention of returning for work for the struck
employer at the termination of the strike."
The Appellant, in his brief, (page 2) admits thal
he is not entitled to unemployment compensation fro!11
his employment at Kennecott but contends that he ii
entitled to such compensation from his work with Snlt
Lake Turkey Processing Company.
The Employment Security Act, Chapter 35-t
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U.C.1\., contains no provisions which would allow a

beneiit computation which would accomplish such result. His unemployment was directly due to the strike
at Kennecott.
From the record and the testimony, it is clear that
the Appellant considered his employment with Salt Lake
Turkey Processing as secondary and supplementary
and he considered himself to be a regular permanent
employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation.
Therefore it is clear that the Department, as affirmed by the Board of Review, had no choice in view
nf the obvious intentions of Appellant but to deny benefits on the grounds that the Appellant was, at the time
he filed his claims for unemployment compensation
benefits, an employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation and that the only reason he was unemployed was
because there was a stoppage of work due to a strike in
which he was involved.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission denying unemployment compensation
to the Appellant was founded upon substantial evidence
and its decision should be affirmed.
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